University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive

OSSA 10

May 22nd, 9:00 AM - May 25th, 5:00 PM

Are arguments abstract objects?
Steven W. Patterson
Marygrove College, Department of Philosophy, Religious Studies and Humanities

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Patterson, Steven W., "Are arguments abstract objects?" (2013). OSSA Conference Archive. 130.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA10/papersandcommentaries/130

This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Are arguments abstract objects?
STEVEN W. PATTERSON
Department of Philosophy, Religious Studies and Humanities
Marygrove College
8425 W. McNichols Rd.
Detroit, MI 48221
USA
spatterson@marygrove.edu

ABSTRACT: Geoff Goddu's 2010 paper "Is 'Argument' subject to the process/product ambiguity?"
and Paul Simard-Smith and Andrei Moldovan's 2011 paper “Arguments as abstract objects” have
revived the dialogue about what might be called the "metaphysics of argument". Both papers are
important. Both also seem to me to be open to significant objections. In this paper I will lay out some
of these objections and give, in rough outline, the kernel of an alternative approach.
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There is little to be gained by making a frontal assault on the
question of what an argument is. Instead, let us approach it indirectly
by discussing how arguments are appraised and evaluated. (C. L.
Hamblin, Fallacies Ch.7., p. 231)

1. GODDU ON THE PROCESS/PRODUCT DISTINCTION
In his 2011 paper, "Is 'argument' subject to the product/process ambiguity?" Geoff
Goddu considers a number of possible ontologies for argument. Considering the
view that an argument is a set of propositions, Goddu (2011) writes:
If the group that is the argument just is a set, say the ordered set of a set of
propositions and another proposition, then, since the set is itself an abstract object
and exists independently of anyone thinking of it or creating it, the group is not
produced by the act of arguing. (p. 78)

Goddu's point is to show that acts of arguing aren't necessary to form groupings of
propositions. This seems perfectly obvious and in need of no further comment.
With respect to the conception of arguments as groupings of sentence tokens
(he quickly and rightly dismisses groupings of sentence types, to which many of the
same problems afflicting propositions would apply), Goddu asserts that acts of
arguing only serve to make manifest what already exists. The tokens exist "in the
head" first, and it is only after they come into being that acts of argument are even
possible. On this conception, the individual argument not only may but must preexist the act. So if one thinks of arguments as sets of sentence-tokens then the
Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-15.
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process/product ambiguity fares poorly.
But what about the possibility that arguments are sets of utterances, or
speech acts? These too are not created by acts of arguing, says Goddu (2011):
The statements, or utterances, or speech acts currently being made just are the acts
of stating or uttering that constitute the current act of arguing. If I were not to make
those statements, or utterances, or speech acts in the proper context or order there
would be no act of arguing. Hence, taking arguments to be composed of statements,
or utterances, or speech acts does not support the claim that arguments are the
products of the process of arguing. (p. 81)

An analogy may be helpful here. Suppose one wants to build a bicycle. The act of
building the bicycle is not the bicycle. Similarly, the bicycle is not straightforwardly
identical with the various parts of which it is made. To hold the view that arguments
are the products of acts of making arguments out of sentential or illocutionary
“parts”, on this analogy then, would be like holding that bicycles just are the
products of acts of assembly of wheels, chains, sprockets, pedals, and so forth. But
this cannot be so on Goddu's analysis, for in both cases the act of building either is
preceded by an idea of what is to be built or cannot be executed without the parts.
Similarly, one could connect the bicycle parts in any way allowable by their physical
characteristics, but the result would not necessarily be a bicycle. Only if one
competently assembles the parts with the idea of a bicycle in mind will the result be
a bicycle. This, or something like it, seems to be what Goddu (2011) means when he
closes the paper with the following observation:
Regardless of one’s chosen ontology of arguments (propositions, sentences,
utterances, statements, speech acts, or sets or groups thereof), either the arguments
exist prior to the relevant acts of arguing or are constituents of those acts of
arguing—they are not the products of those acts of arguing.(p. 88)

Goddu's analysis of the process/product ambiguity is interesting and potent, but he
leaves the most interesting question unanswered: just what is the best ontology of
arguments? Paul Simard Smith and Andrei Moldovan try to give an answer to this
question, but before examining their attempt it will be worthwhile to consider
another lesson that can be drawn from Goddu's paper.
Goddu considers three possible ontologies of argument: a propositional
ontology, a sentence-token-based ontology, and a speech-act-based ontology. On
none of the three, he convincingly argues, is it plausible to suppose that arguments
come into being as the result of acts or events of arguing. 1 This is fine, so far as it
By 'acts or events of arguing' here I mean to refer only to those acts that assert arguments. I do not
intend to refer to just anything that might take place in an episode of argumentation. For clarity's
sake I will adopt the convention of using 'argument' and its cognates to refer only to the expression
or assertion of premise-conclusion sequences. Similarly, I will use 'argumentation' to refer to the
larger-scale dialectical processes in which agents offer arguments, counter-arguments, criticisms,
questions, responses, challenges, etc. to one another. I do not assume that my merely adopting these
conventions settles the question of whether or not 'argument' is properly separable from
'argumentation'.
1

2
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goes. Note, however, that the fundamental thing all three conceptions share apart
from their potential use in support of process-centric conceptions of argument is the
notion that arguments are sets of somethings--either propositions, sentence-tokens,
or speech acts, respectively. No conception of argument could stop there. As one can
immediately see, not just any group of propositions, statements or utterances is
going to be an argument. It is highly unlikely, for example, that the set of the first
three propositions/sentences/utterances uttered by Douglas MacArthur in his radio
address to the American people on September 2, 1945 ("Today the guns are silent. A
great tragedy has ended. A great victory has been won.") plus the first one uttered
by me to my children on the morning of January 22, 2012 ("We're having pancakes
for breakfast.") make an argument. So what is it, exactly, that marks out a set that is
an argument as opposed to any other kind? I shall call this the argument
classification problem. A satisfactory answer to this problem doesn't have to tell us
how to classify any set of propositions with which we might find ourselves
confronted, it need only tell us what features, if any, of any given set of propositions,
statements or utterances makes that set an argument.
Thinking of argument as the product of a process or act has the advantage of
solving this problem rather handily--all and only those groupings that come into
being as the result of an act of arguing could count as arguments. Random
assemblages like the Macarthur-pancake set would fail such a test and so would not.
So it's not as if process or act-based conceptions of argument have nothing going for
them, as Goddu seems at times to suggest. But need we be driven to a process
answer to the argument classification problem? Simard-Smith and Moldovan say no.
2. SIMARD-SMITH AND MOLDOVAN ON THE ONTOLOGY OF ARGUMENT
Bravely forsaking metaphysical agnosticism, Paul Simard-Smith and Andrei
Moldovan propose an answer to the question of the ontology of argument. They
write:
On our account, arguments are created when an agent forms an intention to infer, in
a certain way, a proposition from some other propositions." (Simard-Smith &
Moldovan, 2011, p. 257)

So far, so good. What is needed is an account of what ways of forming an "intention
to infer" count as the right ones. To their credit Simard-Smith and Moldovan do not
leave it to the reader's imagination. They supply this account:
...an argument’s existence depends on an agent relating some set of propositions S to
another proposition p by intending that p be inferred from S in accordance with a
rule of inference. And, since this intention to infer comes into existence at a certain
time, arguments are temporal and are produced by human beings. A fortiori, given
that arguments are formed by human cognitive activity, arguments are not mindindependent. In a very real sense their existence depends on the mental activity of
the agents who formulate them. Finally, lest one be concerned that Anselm’s
Ontological Argument be a concrete object, this very same argument, as mentioned
earlier, can be expressed today in a place spatially distant from the place Anselm
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first formulated it, and it can be expressed today in more than one place at the same
time." (Simard-Smith & Moldovan, 2011, p. 257)

Before going any further it should be clear that the account on offer here would
solve the argument classification problem: all and only those sets of propositions,
sentences or utterances formed by an intentional, cognitive act of rule-guided
inferential connection count as arguments. But how is this mental activity not a
process, an act-of-arguing in Goddu's sense? Certainly it cannot be the fact that all of
this takes place "in the head" that excepts it from the process label. If anything, what
separates Simard-Smith's and Moldovan's account from process accounts is that
communicative intention (the sine qua non of process-centric theories) has no place
in it. In the place that communicative intention would occupy is, instead, an
inferential intention. This idea isn't implausible on its face, but it is subject to some
powerful objections.
2.1 Objections to the SSM Account
For easy reference it will be helpful to have in hand an outline of Simard-Smith and
Moldovan's account (hereafter, the SSM account or just, 'SSM').
'P therefore Q' is an argument if and only if:
1.
2.

Some agent, S, intends to infer Q from P at time t, AND
S's intended inference accords with a rule.

The meeting of these conditions is something that happens (presumably) in the
mind of an agent. there being the appropriate sort of mental act. Once the act is
done, 'P therefore Q' is created as an abstract object capable of expression by other
agents at other places and times. The analysis seems neat and clean. In the following
sections, however, I give a trio of cases that reveal some serious problems for it.
Case (1): CONCERT
Suppose that an agent, S, intends to go to a piano recital in the
afternoon. She then hears from a reliable source that the pianist has
the flu. Quite reasonably, she also holds that if the pianist has the flu
then there will be no concert this afternoon. Clearly, if she believes
both of these things, then it seems as though she has a decent
argument that there will be no concert this afternoon. But she refuses
to draw the inference, and carries through with plans to attend the
concert anyway.
That there will be no concert is straightforwardly implied by her other
commitments according to modus ponens. So condition 2 of the SSM account is met.
But, we must not draw the conclusion that there is an argument here on that basis
alone, for condition 1 specifies that the intent to infer is also required. On the SSM
4
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account all that need happen for condition 1 to fail to be satisfied is that S not form
the intention to draw the inference. To be clear: S does not have to deny that P and
P->Q together imply that Q. She just has to refuse to apply the rule in this case. Let us
assume that it is at least possible that there is a difference between recognizing that
an inference could be drawn and intending to draw that inference oneself. To reduce
the apparent tension some might feel in this way of talking we might simply add to
the present case the suppositions that S has good reason to think that she saw the
pianist out jogging this morning, and judges that it is unlikely that the pianist has the
flu if this is the case. So S's reluctance to draw the conclusion that there will be no
concert is motivated by uncertainty about the truth of one of the premises, not a
rejection of modus ponens.
Even with this comforting contextual story there appears to be a problem for
the SSM account. In the absence of the intention to infer, SSM are committed to
saying, at least with respect to S, that there is no argument at all, from the
conjunction of P and P->Q, to Q. This seems strange. For it seems indisputable that,
in some sense, an argument is there, S just doesn't want to make it. Perhaps in such
a case the most we could say that, as a matter of how far she is willing to go in terms
of her intentions to make inferences, S has no argument--not that there is no
argument at all. The SSM account does not permit us say this, though. According to
it, the intention to infer is a necessary condition for there being an argument. An
argument "exists", then, only if there is an agent who intends to make the inference
it contains. The strangeness of the present case is that, at least some sense, it is
perfectly clear that there can be an argument, even when an agent does not intend
to make the needed inference. This casts doubt on the necessity of condition 1 of the
SSM account.
To preserve a role of the intention to infer in the SSM account, some might be
tempted to treat it as a sufficient condition rather than a necessary condition for the
existence of an argument. I agree with SSM that this would not be a good idea. The
following example demonstrates why.
Case (2): PANCAKE
Suppose that, being in a jaunty mood, S forms a non-ironic intention to
infer 'Pancakes are the greatest food on earth.' from 'The atomic
weight of Helium is 2'.
Now, to be clear, I do not deny that S really might intend to infer the pancake
statement from the helium statement, but (unless one wishes to allow the possibility
of a correct but unexpressed, perhaps unconscious chain of appropriate inferences
in S's mind that connects the atomic weight of helium to the evaluative status of
pancakes in the necessary fashion) it seems clear that the intention would fail in its
aim. S's intent to infer is no more sufficient for the production of an argument than
my intent to cook Coq au Vin is sufficient for the production of Coq au Vin. The
actions that are taken in pursuit of the intention must be attended with at least
some sort of success in order for the product to come to be. In the case of cooking,
this would mean, among other things, that one would have to perform correct
5
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actions on the appropriate ingredients at the appropriate times. One must learn
these conditions and requirements, through a recipe perhaps, or instruction. What is
clear is that there is more to cooking than forming intentions of a certain sort. The
same seems to hold for of arguing. This point suggests a line of questioning that I
will not pursue here but that I think is important. This is the question of whether
and to what degree it is possible for anyone to have an argument, and to know that
they have an argument, in the absence of any possibility of communicating that
argument to others who would recognize it as such according to the standards,
conventions, and practices of their shared community. This is not to suggest
relativism about the rules of argumentation so much as it is to highlight a well
placed worry of a roughly Wittgensteinian sort that I think any needs to be
answered by account of argument that strips out the communicative dimension. It
may be that the authors of the SSM account can address this worry, but they do not
take it up in the paper under discussion.
This is why the SSM account is correct not to accord too much creative power
to the intent to infer. The intent to argue simply isn't enough to make an argument.
As an additional necessary condition they stipulate that the inference in question
must be formed in accord with a rule of inference. It should be pointed out that this
isn't, on its face, as implausible suggestion as it might seem to many. For what else is
there to fill the gap in their account? What else is there that might stand to
'inference' in the same relationship that 'recipe' stands to 'cook' in the Coq au Vin
example? The rules of pragma-dialectics find their application at a different level of
analysis. So too do the guidelines and best practices of the various rhetorical
approaches to argument. Both would re-import the process/product distinction that
the authors, following Goddu want to avoid. Working by elimination it becomes
clear that there really aren't many alternatives for the SSM account to look toward.
Requiring inference in accord with rules of inference begins to look better in this
light.
Indeed, it becomes even better if we stipulate that the rules of inference
required need not even necessarily be those of the classical deductive canon. They
could be Bayesian, for example, or even dialethic. Perhaps all that is need for the
production of argument (in addition to the intention to infer, of course), is for the
inference(s) to hold according to the rules of some system, any system. Thus
understood, is the requirement that the inference be made in accord with a rule
capable of providing a necessary condition for the existence of an argument?
Unhappily, I believe the answer to the previous question is probably "No".
SSM's addition of the condition requiring a rule of inference, if anything, only makes
matters worse. There are any number of good arguments that don't follow any
known rule of inference. Consider, for example, the case I will call SNOW:
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Case (3): SNOW
Suppose that a mother responds to her child's demand for a reason
why she should wear her uncomfortable winter hat: "It is snowing
outside, this is the reason why you should wear your cap."
Assuming that the premise of SNOW is true, and that the intention to infer is present
on the speaker's part in both cases, the SSM account leaves us no way of saying
consistently that SNOW is an argument and PANCAKE is not.
An heroically determined defender of the SSM account might respond by
declaring SNOW an enthymeme.2 Properly reconstructed, this defender might tell
us, SNOW does conform to a rule of inference. That might be so--but then again it
might not. Even if it is the defender of the SSM account is still burdened with the
obligation of telling us why SNOW is not an argument when SNOW precisely is what
S says, and precisely represents the inference that S actually intends to make.
2.2. Options for the SSM Account?
Clearly then, it seems as though the SSM account cannot solve the classification
problem. Defenders of the SSM account, at this point, have the following options:
1.

Bite the bullet where arguments like SNOW are concerned and either
declare them enthymematic or rule them out. This will defend their
account from PANCAKE-type counter-examples, but it does nothing to
allay the worry posed by CONCERT, that there might be "real"
arguments that persist even if no agent intends the inference therein.

2.

Abandon the requirement that accord with a rule of inference be
necessary for an intended inference to result in an argument. This has
the aforementioned problem of collapsing their account into an
extreme subjectivism about argument whereby any [P,Q] counts if the
agent intends to infer one member from the other.

3.

Contra Goddu, rehabilitate the process/product distinction and treat
arguments as inseparable from the processes of argumentation in
which they are embedded. This amounts to declaring the classification
problem insoluble.

Certainly there will be those who would be perfectly happy with either option 1 or
option 2. It goes without saying that 3 will have its proponents as well. In what
remains of this paper, however, I wish to explore a fourth alternative. For it seems
The only other alternative I can think of is one that SSM do not explore, that of working from a
conception of material inference along the lines outlined in Brandom (1994). It would be interesting
to see such an attempt made, though for reasons that become clearer below it doesn't seem clear to
me that it would offer much hope of saving the SSM account.
2
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to me that there is methodological value in thinking of arguments as artifacts, even if
the SSM account doesn't tell quite the right story about them. Apart from this
methodological value, there is also the considerable linguistic evidence mounted by
SSM for the proposition that 'argument' frequently if not usually plays the role of an
object in those English sentences in which it occurs. There may be something of
importance laying underneath our ordinary language here, so we owe it to ourselves
at least to investigate the possibility it presents. This means that the classification
problem must be dispensed with. In light of the difficulties sketched so far, and in
keeping with the spirit of the quote from Hamblin with which this paper began, I
suggest an oblique rather than a frontal strategy. The main idea of this strategy is to
follow a route to thinking about the concept of argument along which the problem
does not arise.
3. A SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE: MUSICAL WORKS AND ARGUMENTS
Thankfully, our investigation of the ontological status of arguments need not
proceed from scratch. A little reflection on the kinds of considerations that make it
seem reasonable to treat arguments as things points the way to similar, much more
thoroughly treated problems in the philosophy of music regarding the ontological
status of musical works. To explore this analogy is very much within the spirit of the
SSM proposal as they themselves assert that arguments are similar to musical
works. What grounds might there be for this similarity?
In the first place, both musical works and arguments are human creations. It
is true that computers can be programmed to argue, but as those programs are the
result of human intelligence themselves, it doesn't seem overly problematic (yet) to
think of argument as a primarily human phenomenon. Computers can also play and,
in perhaps a limited way, compose music. What goes for arguments in such cases
seems to go for music too. As humans are the authors of the programs that play
and/or write the music, the phenomenon of music can still be generally seen as
human for present purposes.
Secondly, and importantly for the present investigation, both musical works
and arguments seem to exhibit recognizable identities. Beethoven's Fifth Symphony,
or Duke Ellington's Mood Indigo, for example, are instantly recognizable to anyone
adequately acquainted with them. In the same way, Anselm's Ontological Argument,
or Martin Luther King's arguments in "Letter from a Birmingham Jail" are instantly
recognizable. Equally important is a third, related observation: The grounds of the
identity both of musical works and of arguments are incredibly hard to pin down
with any satisfaction. I will have more to say about important implications of these
points in a moment.
Before moving to those implications let us add a fourth condition. Both
musical works and arguments, though known through encounters with them of a
physical sort (e.g. via the vibrations of sound waves in the ears or visual perceptions
of written text--or, in the case of performers, through other senses as well) are at
least partially abstract. Basic recognition that something is music or is an argument
at all requires the possession of a certain particular background. In the first
instance, both in the case of the work and in the case of the argument, the bare
8
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physical elements of any encounter--say the written score of Mood Indigo, or the
page of an introductory philosophy textbook containing Anselm's Argument--are
not enough to establish that one is experiencing a musical work, or an argument in
question. This point should be clear enough. After all, we spend considerable effort
training students to detect arguments--largely through investing them with a
conceptual background and a methodological basis for doing the task. In the case of
the musical score or even, in the case of certain very technical or abstract kinds of
music, the auditory perception of a performance, one also needs training to augment
one's intuitions in a way that will lead one to the recognition that what one is
looking at or hearing is, in fact, music. The same may be said of arguments, which
are often no less subtle.
Let us extend this point to the case of individual works of music and
individual arguments. There are many arguments for the existence of God. We
believe that among them is a particular one, say Anselm's, of which we can say "This
is the one--this is Anselm's argument". We hold a similar belief about works of
music. Even if played on a kazoo as a joke, anyone who knows the piece can
recognize the theme of Beethoven's Third Symphony. Both arguments and music can
be realized in various media. Beethoven's Third Symphony can be performed with a
variety of arrangements, or even electronically, by a program running an 8-bit
analog synthesizer program.3 Anselm's argument can be written or spoken in nearly
any natural language. It could even be sung in a nice contrabass. And yet we would
recognize it as readily as we would recognize the opening strains of Beethoven's
Third. What this shows is that we are capable, both in the case of musical works and
in the case of arguments, of recognizing sameness despite large gaps in temporal
continuity and widely differing circumstances of production. Exactly how we do this
is an interesting question, but one that for now will have to be put off to the side. For
the present purpose it is enough if it is plausible that arguments and works of music
are sufficiently alike in the matter of their having identity conditions that allow us to
recognize them in a variety of contexts, at a variety of different locations and times.
In the philosophy of music this is idea is indicated by saying that works of music are
"multiple entities" (Kania, 2008, p. 24-29). If the foregoing is right, arguments seem
also to be multiple entities.
To sum up I have argued that arguments and musical works are alike in that
1) both are human productions, 2) there are important cases of individual
arguments and individual musical works with recognizable identity conditions that
3) are hard to establish in any concrete way. I have also argued the similarity on the
grounds 4) that recognition of something as music or as an argument in and of itself
requires possession of a special battery of concepts and methods and that 5) both
works of music and arguments are "multiple entities". Let us suppose for the
Some in the philosophy music who adhere to versions of strong Platonism would reject this
assertion, holding that the precise arrangement of instrumentation intended by the composer is
necessary for the performance of a musical work to be genuine. This position strikes me as extremely
implausible, for reasons that are explained in great detail by Goehr (1992). Though I do not share her
assumption that analytic philosophy of art is driven to such theories, I believe her criticisms of strong
Platonism are correct.
3
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moment then, that these are sufficient grounds of similarity between musical works
and arguments for thinking that their ontologies might be comparable as well. What
might the ontology of musical works suggest about the ontology of arguments?
3.1 The Open Concept Approach
The ontological nature of musical works is one of the most hotly contested topics in
the philosophy of music.4 Unfortunately a full review of this discussion would take
this paper far afield of its limited purpose. To simplify matters, I will instead
proceed to use the proposal for the ontology of musical work that I find most helpful
for the purpose of avoiding the classification problem. This is the proposal that
'musical work' is an open concept.
The best-known formulation of this view was first given by Weitz in his 1956
essay "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics":
The problem of the nature of art is like that of the nature of games, at least in these
respects: If we actually look and see what it is that we call "art", we will also find no
common properties--only strands of similarities. Knowing what art is is not
apprehending some manifest or latent essence but being able to recognize, describe,
and explain those things we call "art" in virtue of these similarities. (p. 78)

That the concept of art seems to be better accounted for by a constellation of
similarities than by hard and fast conditions of necessity and sufficiency is what
leads Weitz to call the concept of art "open" or, interchangeably, "open textured." He
goes on to explain further what this means:
A concept is open if its conditions are emendable and corrigible; i.e. if a situation or
a case can be imagined or secured which would call for some sort of decision on our
part to extend the use of the concept to cover this, or to close the concept and invent
a new one to deal with the new case and its new property. If necessary and sufficient
conditions can be stated for the concept, then the concept is a closed one. But this
can happen only in logic or mathematics where concepts are constructed and
completely defined. (Weitz, 1956, p.79)

Already, those working in informal logic and argumentation theory should find
themselves on familiar grounds, for such "decisions" lie precisely at the heart of
many of our discussions. That said, some more clarification is in order. The notion of
an open concept did not originate with Weitz, or in the philosophy of art. Not only
does its origin cloud the issue, but the alternate life of the term 'open concept' under
certain usages in the philosophy of law also has the potential to mislead.
The earliest usage of the term 'open concept' in a journal of philosophy (at
least the earliest I can find) has it more or less synonymous with a concept's being
vague in such a way that only a survey of popular usage can settle it:
Here is the solution of the very difficult epistemological problem of the existence of
both "open " and "closed'" concepts or meaning. A closed meaning is, e.g., a square.
4

A good overview of the contemporary discussion can be found in Kania (2008).
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One need not be in doubt as to what is the rule determining the set of squares. But
what about, e.g., "bald-headed"? Is this a gentleman with 62 hairs, or with 188,or
what? The extension of an open concept (meaning) can only be decided by voting or
a Gallup poll. And most meanings are open in this sense. (Meyer, 1949, p. 390)

Certainly this is not what we should want in the case of 'argument'. Openness in
Weitz's sense partakes of vagueness but isn't coextensive with it in the way that the
above quote would suggest. This is grasped immediately when one considers how
uncomfortably Weitz's notion of an open concept sits with the idea of deciding
application by a vote or a poll. For this fails to take account of the kinds of
paradigmatic examples that give an open concept like 'art' its epistemological center
of gravity. That 'art' as a concept is not susceptible to a sorties paradox in the way
that 'bald' is another sign that there are two notions that ought to be kept separate
here. Open concepts share with vague concepts the phenomenon of having
problems of application at the boundaries, but the problems are of a different sort,
and are addressed with different strategies. In the case of a vague term like 'bald' or
'rich', the context of utterance often guides us in the question of whether or not to
extend the term to a particular case. Alternatively, we might also stipulate a range of
application for a specific, delimiting purpose--as when we define terms
operationally for the purpose of statistical research.
Neither of these strategies seems to avail us with open concepts like 'art'. It
would be strange to think that in one context an object is a work of art, while in
another context it fails to be so. Clearly this is so in paradigm cases like Picasso's
Guernica or Mahler's Symphony No. 2. Similarly, it would seem strange to appeal to
context when trying to settle the question of whether a borderline case, say a child's
finger-painting or a skilled forgery was a work of art. In both of those cases it is
other properties of the work that command our attention as we struggle to decide
whether or not the concept of 'art' or 'work' should be extended to cover them. The
immediate context doesn't seem to matter much, if at all. Less so does it seem as
though we could settle the matter by stipulation. So in addition to the features taken
from Weitz's account above, we ought to add the caution that a concept's being open
is not to be confused with its being vague in the typical sense. There is another
caution that needs to be added as well, and this is to avoid confusing the lack of
necessary and sufficient conditions with a lack of substantive content of any sort.
This is a risk one runs if following certain strains of thought in the
philosophy of law, where the openness of an open concept signifies that the content
of the concept is to be filled in by legislative or sometimes judicial processes.
Examples of this type of concept in the law are 'the common good' and 'the public
interest'. Such concepts are often considered 'open' in the sense that the particulars
of their content may be vary widely, subject to differences in interpretation at
various times. This sense of 'openness' is discussed in Bedner (2010). For a given
community, what was considered a matter falling within the scope of the common
good in the Seventeenth Century, for instance conformity to certain religious
doctrines or practices, may be considered to be essentially a private matter in the
Twenty-first.
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This is also not the sort of account of open concepts that should be expected
to help for the present purpose. Whether we are talking about 'art' or 'argument', it
seems clear that we are not bound to the sort of socio-historical relativism that
underwrites the kind of openness at issue in the kind of legal usage I've described
here. Our practice with both terms shows this. Much of what we now consider to be
Ancient Greek art was not thought of as art at all. Indeed, it isn't clear whether or
not the Ancient Greeks had a concept of artwork like the one we now possess
(though certainly they had concepts of beauty and excellence of technique). This
doesn't stop us from using our aesthetic vocabulary to treat a black-figured
amphora skillfully painted with triremes from Periclean Athens as a piece of art.
Similarly, with arguments, socio-historical context doesn't seem to have the power
to change whether or not a particular set of propositions, sentences, utterances, etc.
should be considered an argument. Our evaluations of the quality of a particular
argument might be, and in some cases perhaps even should be, indexed in such a
way, but not our use of the concept 'argument' itself.
So, to recapitulate, to say that a concept is open is not to say that is vague in
the usual sense of being subject to the Sorites paradox. Nor is it to say that the
concept is a mere placeholder, the actual content of which is completely determined
by socio-historical processes. Lydia Goehr (1992) sums up the sort of openness at
issue this way:
We should never be mislead by the idea of openness. We might think that calling a
concept open implies that 'anything goes', that unless a concept has a fixed or
bounded identity, anything in principle could fall under it. This is mistaken.
...Conceptual change is restricted in precise and different ways depending on a
concept's particular use.
Suppose you wanted to produce a radical change in the way a given concept was
used, and you thought this could be done by producing something incorporating a
denial of everything we (others) thought was involved in the employment of this
concept. We could only understand it to be a use of this concept if we found it to
have a significant connection to something which constituted the use of this concept
in the past. Otherwise we would simply deny that your use had anything to do with
the concept at all....If this is a plausible view of concepts...the nature of conceptual
continuity and relevant restrictions must be spelled out carefully from case to case.
(pp. 94-5)

To say that 'argument' is an open concept, then, will be simply to say that while we
may be clear about paradigm cases or particular properties that arguments should
have, (e.g. at least some sort of reasonable inferential linkage between the premises
and the conclusion) it will still be the case that the borders of the concept are not
decisively settled.5 Assigning a novel case to the concept will be a matter of showing
how doing so is continuous with other such assignments that have been made in the
past. We will not simply be able to declare that something is an argument because
The current discussion of whether or not there can be visual or other nonverbal types of arguments
strikes me as a good example of the kinds of philosophical debate that could be expected to happen
along the borders of the concept of argument.
5
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our intuitions say so. A case will have to be made and defended that we have not
wandered off the ranch. While this doesn't give us the kind of neat and tidy decision
procedure that checking against necessary and sufficient conditions does, it does
give us a way of explaining what ought to count as an argument and why. Once the
central characteristics of the concept are articulated and a sufficient number of
paradigm cases identified, then resources will in place for the discussion that takes
place on the borders of the concept's extension. There may be other benefits as well
to the open concept approach. I suggest that at least two can already be identified.
3.2 Two Advantages of the Open Concept Approach
If the analogical argument I have given here stands up to scrutiny, then there is at
least some reason to think that 'argument' is an open concept in much the same way
that 'musical work' might be. Two benefits of approaching the concept of 'argument'
in this way are immediately evident.
3.2.1. The Classification Problem is Avoided
The classification problem, recall, was the problem of identifying the criteria that
make it possible to classify a set of propositions, sentences, or utterances as an
argument. The SSM approach fails to solve this problem because the criteria it
proposes are either too wide (as illustrated by PANCAKE) or too narrow (as
illustrated by SNOW), and because at least one of its conditions is neither necessary
nor sufficient (as demonstrated in CONCERT).
Treating 'argument' as an open concept avoids such difficulties because the
boundaries of an open concept are not fixed by firm criteria that need to be satisfied
in advance. Instead, an open concept is built aggregatively out of similarity relations
between cases, at least some of which are so clear that it's barely possible to doubt
that they belong in the category. Just as works such as Beethoven's Third Symphony
and Tizol's Caravan, as performed by Art Blakey, supply the sort of clear examples
around which a central understanding of what a musical work is can be built,
premise-conclusion sequences like the famous Socrates syllogism (All men are
mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal) and humbler but infinitely
more familiar ones like "It's raining, so you should take your umbrella." (among
many others) form the kind of core that is needed for an open concept approach to
'argument'.
It is true that this advantage comes at the price of the sort of clarity that
philosophers (including myself) tend to find congenial. I submit that this is perhaps
not too high a price to pay in order to avoid being drawn into what promises to be a
wild goose chase after a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for 'argument'
that are impervious to counterexample.
3.2.2. The 'Real Arguments Debate Becomes Tractable
In addition to avoiding the quagmire of the classification problem, the open concept
approach promises to be helpful in a related discussion about what ought to be
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counted as a "real" argument.6 The crux of that debate is a question of whether or
not there is a significant theoretical difference between arguments that are
deployed in argumentation between actual persons in ordinary settings and the
arguments of specialists or teachers, which may or may not have been constructed
for theoretical or pedagogical purposes. The debate is not an idle one, for one of the
justifications of informal logic from the very beginning has been that it develops the
theoretical tools needed to appraise and evaluate arguments of the sort met in daily
life, in contrast to the artificial sorts of arguments given in deductive logic textbooks
for the purpose of training students in the skills of of various formal systems. One
can use informal logic to considerable benefit at work, or in political contexts, so the
claim goes, but one cannot so use deductive logic (unless one happens to be a
programmer or a philosopher).
If we approach 'argument' as an open concept, then it seems to me that much
that moves this debate can be put to rest, for there would be no significant
theoretical difference between the sorts of arguments used to teach logic (either
formal or informal) and the sorts of arguments one encounters in daily life.
Following the analogy with music, the arguments occurring in logic textbooks would
be like the songs that occur in introductory music textbooks. The Socrates syllogism
is our Mary Had a Little Lamb. It stands to complicated arguments in the public
sphere about the international financial crisis in much the same way that Mary Had
a Little Lamb stands to Rachmaninoff's Third Piano Concerto. The difference is one
largely of degree of complexity or sophistication, not one of kind or subcategory.
That few arguments we encounter in daily life resemble the neat and tidy Socrates
syllogism, or follow modus ponens need not trouble us at all.
This does mean that informal logic will not be able to defend itself on the
grounds that it studies a particular type of argument that students are more likely to
encounter. This seems to me to be an acceptable consequence. After all, the defense
of informal logic as an independent area of inquiry should rest more on its ability to
provide a set of methodologies and conceptual tools that formal logic (however
construed) does not. So long as it can do this--and I believe that it can--there is no
need to fall back on the notion that what makes informal logic special is the
subcategory of arguments that it studies.
4. CONCLUSION
I have attempted in this paper to suggest that one way of putting the metaphysics of
argument on the right footing involves reconceptualizing argument in a way
analogous to that used in the philosophy of art for conceptualizing works of art. On
this view, arguments have many of the properties that SSM claim that they have,
including the important property of being multiple entities with identity conditions.
The position I've offered here departs from the SSM account in that it requires a
different approach to the concept of argument than the traditional one they take of
6

For the background of this discussion see Hamby (2012) and Goddu (2009).
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attempting to articulate necessary and sufficient conditions. Having argued that this
approach leads them into serious problems, I have suggested that it ought to be
abandoned in favor of an approach that sees argument as an open, regulative
concept that functions as an ideal for practicing arguers.
I should stress, however, that I have only described what such an account
would be like. I have not established that the account is the correct one. I haven't
done much beyond hinting at them to suggest the kinds of characteristics and
paradigm examples that would give the concept of argument its content, either. For
this reason a theorist of argument who preferred the "closed concept" account
would be within her rights to dismiss all that I have said here except for the
objections. At worst, she might say, all I have shown with these objections is that the
conditions offered by SSM are incomplete, or are the wrong ones. "Better that the
search for an answer to the classification problem continue than that we should be
satisfied with the notion that 'argument' is an open concept", she might say. To such
a rejoinder I would have no reply. The contest between the open and closed
accounts of the concept of argument would then come down to which position was
the most perspicuous, and the most fruitful for theorizing about argumentation.
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